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In July 2002, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of 
Canada Association dedicated a plaque at Point 67, south of Caen, 
Normandy, for the regiment’s role in Operation Spring, 25 July 1944. 
After a brief synopsis of the disaster that befell the unit, there is an 
epitaph. It reads, 
“In memory of the men of The Black Watch of Canada and their 
comrades who fought for the liberation of Europe and the hope of a 
better world.”
The final part of that sentence carries meaning beyond the popular 
expression that Canadian servicemen and women fought for our 
freedom. Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth 
Armies and the Second World War by Jonathan Fennell, Senior 
Lecturer at King’s College London, tackles this subject head-on. 
Exactly what was the better world that Commonwealth soldiers were 
fighting for? Were they simply motivated to defeat the Axis powers 
and restore the pre-war and pre-depression status quo? Or did their 
motivation come from something greater? As Fennell demonstrates, 
victory was not enough: “For the ordinary citizen soldier, the war 
was, at heart, about building a better post-war world at home” (p. 
19). The war shaped these soldiers and, in turn, they shaped postwar 
societies across the waning British Empire. 
This core idea spans from multiple “key interlocking strands,” as 
Fennell calls them. The first is the cross-national scope of the book. 
The British and Commonwealth Armies “were purposely designed to 
fight as a multinational team and they must be studied accordingly 
in that light” (p. 5). Although most of the chapters in the book are 
organized both chronologically and by campaign, the experiences of 
soldiers in the Australian, British, Canadian, Indian, New Zealand, 
and South African armies receive coverage.  
Fennell weaves two further strands within and between each of 
these institutions. Fighting the People’s War is not simply a single 
volume operational history of the Second World War campaigns of 
the British and Commonwealth armies. Fennell also aims to establish 
the relationship between the state, the home front, and the soldier at 
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the front. Four chapters deviate from the great battles and campaigns 
by providing a fresh backdrop on events occurring off the battlefield: 
“Mobilisation,” “The Great Imperial Morale Crisis,” “Remobilisation,” 
and “Soldiers and Social Change.” They are arguably the most 
important chapters in the book for two seasons. 
First, they set the stage for new appreciations of battlefield 
performance across the war’s major campaigns. A great example of 
this is the relationship between the New Zealand Furlough Mutiny 
and the performance of the 2nd New Zealand Division during the 
second and third battles of Monte Cassino. Soldiers in the British 
Commonwealth expected their respective states to maintain the 
principle of equality of sacrifice. After fighting in the Mediterranean 
between 1941 and 1943, veteran New Zealand troops returned home. 
Most refused to leave, arguing that capable men with jobs in the 
war industry should now do their bit. In the end, only 13 per cent 
of the 6,000 troops furloughed returned to fight in Italy. This meant 
that the 2nd New Zealand Division forfeited many of its veteran 
soldiers during a tough battle. It also meant that those who remained 
were hardly in the mindset that giving their lives for victory was 
worthwhile. Fennell, therefore, identifies poor morale, stemming from 
New Zealand’s failure to remobilize its people for war, as an important 
factor in the failure at Cassino.
Poor morale could manifest itself in other ways. Of interest to 
Canadians, Fennell examines the case of First Canadian Army in 
Normandy. “Something appeared to be wrong with First Canadian 
Army,” Fennell writes after his discussions of Operations Totalize 
and Tractable (p. 543). These operations failed to close the Falaise 
Gap from the north as rapid as General Bernard Montgomery 
hoped, permitting tens of thousands of German troops to escape. 
Fennell argues that while command and control had a role in this 
setback, a serious drop in Canadian Army morale also played a part. 
Friendly fire incidents involving the US Army Air Forces and RAF 
Bomber Command added to a situation that saw untested armoured 
divisions paired with an exhausted 3rd Canadian Division and a 2nd 
Canadian Division that had sustained heavy casualties in its first 
battles. It is, however, interesting that Fennell has not given much 
consideration to evidence that historians have underestimated the 
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strength of the German forces arrayed against these offensives.1 In 
spite of new scholarship on the subject, C.P. Stacey’s assessment of 
these operations continues to influence non-specialists. 
These critical chapters also offer new perspectives on the 
attitudes of British Commonwealth troops toward the war effort. 
Fennell shows how the British state largely alienated its soldiers by 
failing to engage with their hopes for the future. Morale reports told 
Winston Churchill that “‘the nearest thing’ that the ordinary soldier 
had to a conscious ‘war aim’ was ‘to make sure that he will have a 
home and a job and what he regards as a fair deal after the war’” 
(p. 237). Yet Churchill, even after the urging of his Labour Party 
deputy, Clement Attlee, refused to consider social reforms until the 
war ended. Instead, army education through the Army Bureau of 
Current Affairs (ABCA), stepped in to fill the gap and helped “the 
soldier ‘operationalise’ his emerging social and political consciousness” 
(p.639). In large numbers, the soldiers came to support the expansion 
of social services and believed that the principles of fairness and 
justice should underpin all government policy. 
This leads to the third key strand Fennell identifies: a democratic 
approach to history. Most histories of the Second World War either 
discuss the great commanders and politicians, or they examine the 
coal face of war using selected letters, diaries, and memoirs of those 
who fought. Fennell’s approach is different. To gauge the morale of 
the Commonwealth Armies over time and to understand how the 
troops’ thinking evolved, he uses 925 censorship summaries based 
on 17 million letters sent by soldiers during the war. He also relies 
on forty-four morale reports published throughout the war, along 
with statistics on sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, away without 
leave, and self-inflicted wounds. These sources, Fennell argues, allow 
historians to democratize the history of the war by getting at the 
experience of the average soldier. Fennell provides the reader with a 
solid overview of the strengths and weaknesses of these sources in the 
first chapter. He also provides further methodological explanations in 
four appendices, offering scholars a great starting point for conducting 
their own inquiries with these resources.
Perhaps Fennell’s most eye-opening conclusion in the book is 
related to the role of the state in society, democracy, and the soldier 
1  Gregory Liedtke, “Canadian Offensive Operations in Normandy Revisited,” 
Canadian Military Journal 8, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 61.
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as a political actor. The overwhelming evidence of the censorship 
summaries suggests “that soldiers were deeply interested in politics 
and the state of the home front” (p. 255). Fennell examines the 
voting behaviour of troops across the Commonwealth and finds that 
the closer an individual was to combat duty the more likely he was 
to vote for a party advocating for the expansion of social services 
and working towards a more equal and socially just society. In 
Canada in 1945, this meant that the Liberals and the Co-Operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) together garnered the support 
of over 66 per cent of armed forces voters. Of those stationed in 
Northwest Europe, nearly 39 per cent voted CCF, beating Prime 
Minister W. L. Mackenzie King’s Liberals by nearly 10 points. The 
governing party likely suffered from its fumbling over conscription 
but the Progressive Conservatives (PC) did even worse. Only 25 per 
cent of servicemen in Northwest Europe put their faith in the PCs 
(p. 634). In general, Fennell found that some soldiers expressed the 
opinion that “‘too much Gov[ernmen]t control will rob the future ex-
servicemen of the liberty for which they are now fighting.’” Yet these 
sentiments were rare and the left’s narrative “resonated powerfully 
with servicemen in the Army” (p. 642).  
Fennell’s study, reaching 700 pages of text and nearly 200 of 
notes and bibliography, is extensive but not all-encompassing. For 
instance, the author deals solely with the regular army, so special 
forces like the Commandoes, the First Special Service Force, or the 
Chindits do not factor into the analysis. Nor do the members of the 
Auxiliary Territorial Service, the Canadian Women’s Army Corps, 
or similar Commonwealth women’s army services. Also missing from 
the analysis are the experiences of half a million colonial soldiers and 
43,000 members of the Irish Free State who soldiered with the British 
Army. These omissions, necessary to keep an already lengthy study 
manageable, offer profound gaps (especially of colonial troops and 
women) for scholars to fill in the future. 
One gap that Canadian military historians will find disagreeable 
is Fennell’s decision to leave certain battles, like Hong Kong and 
Dieppe, out of scope. The absence of the disaster that befell the 
Canadian Army at Dieppe is particularly curious, considering the 
damage it must have caused to the morale of the 2nd Canadian 
Division. That said, Fennell has given us a direction and methodology 
that can help remedy this.
F I T Z G E R A L D - B L A C K 
24 Book Reviews
In addition to being an excellent single-volume history of the 
Second World War campaigns of the British and Commonwealth 
Armies, Fighting the People’s War should receive broad attention. 
Military leaders interested both in the impact of morale on the 
battlefield and in working with allies, each with their own domestic 
politics to consider, will be well-served by this study. Furthermore, 
policymakers and political leaders will find the relationship between 
the state, the home front, and the soldier enlightening. Historians 
seeking to better connect the home front with the battlefront will find 
Fennell’s approach both refreshing and valuable. This public historian 
is grateful to Jonathan Fennell for providing an understanding of the 
better world for which British and Commonwealth veterans fought 
and died between 1939 and 1945. 
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